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Abstract
Over the next several years, crop prices are projected to be below to slightly above
commodity loan rates. As a result, marketing loan benefits to farmers, in the form
of loan deficiency payments and marketing loan gains from the commodity loan
program, are likely to continue to be sizeable. The level of realized per-unit 
revenues facilitated by marketing loans exceeds commodity loan rates, thereby
raising expected net returns to farmers. Model simulations show that the loan 
program can raise total acreage planted to major field crops, generally increasing
levels of domestic use and exports while lowering crop prices. Cross-commodity
effects of supply response to relative returns (including marketing loan benefits),
however, result in acreage shifts among competing crops, which can lead to reduc-
tions in plantings of some crops in some years. Most impacts occur in the years
when there are marketing loan benefits, with little effect in subsequent years when
prices rise high enough to eliminate marketing loan benefits. The livestock sector
benefits from these outcomes because of generally lower feed costs. 
Keywords: Commodity loans, marketing loans, nonrecourse loans, loan 
deficiency payments, price support, commodity programs.
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Summary
The commodity loan program has had significant budgetary outlays over the past
few years, largely related to marketing loans. As crop prices declined in the late
1990’s, total marketing loan benefits rose from less than $200 million for 1997
crops to more than $3.8 billion for 1998 and about $8 billion for 1999 crops.
USDA’s February 2000 baseline projections indicate a continuation of sizeable
marketing loan budgetary costs for the next several years, as crop prices are 
projected to be below to slightly above corresponding commodity loan rates,
resulting in revenue-increasing, marketing loan benefits to farmers in the form 
of loan deficiency payments and marketing loan gains. 
This report investigates the nature of market effects in the U.S. agricultural sector
resulting from the commodity loan program with marketing loans. The analysis
uses USDA’s 2000 baseline and simulations of an econometric model for the U.S.
agricultural sector (FAPSIM). Comparisons are made between a loan program 
scenario with marketing loans (representing current policy) and a scenario with 
no commodity loan program. 
Commodity loan programs are one of the major domestic support programs in the
United States. These programs have been in existence in various forms since the
1930’s, primarily covering major field crops. Over the past 15 years, U.S. com-
modity loan programs for major field crops have added marketing loan provisions
to existing nonrecourse loan provisions. As a result, loan programs have effec-
tively moved from providing price support to providing income support without
supporting market prices. 
The level of realized, per-unit revenues facilitated by marketing loans is shown to
exceed commodity loan rates when crop prices are relatively low. Many farmers
use a two-step marketing procedure in which they receive program benefits when
prices are seasonally low (and program benefits high) and then sell their crop later
in the marketing year when prices have risen. 
The historical above-loan-rate level of realized per-unit revenues facilitated by
marketing loans provides a floor for farmers’ expectations of per-unit revenues in
subsequent years. This policy effect raises producers’ expected net returns and is
built into the acreage response functions used in the model simulations to depict
the effects of commodity loan programs with marketing loans.
The commodity loan program with marketing loans can influence planting deci-
sions and acreage allocation. Higher total acreage is planted to major field crops
due to loan program benefits, raising aggregate production. This leads to generally
higher levels of domestic use and exports and lower crop commodity prices as
markets respond to the increase in supplies. 
The commodity loan program with marketing loans can also induce farmers to
shift acreage among competing crops. Acreage changes for individual crops reflect
the effects of marketing loan benefits on absolute and relative net returns amongiv ✺ Analysis of the U.S. Commodity Loan Program / AER-801 Economic Research Service/USDA
cropping alternatives, as well as acreage response elasticities. In some cases,
these cross-commodity effects reduce acreage and production of crops receiving
relatively low or no marketing loan benefits, lowering domestic use and exports 
of those crops while raising their prices. 
Most impacts of marketing loans occur in the years when there are marketing 
loan benefits, with little effect in subsequent years when prices rise high enough 
to eliminate marketing loan benefits. The livestock sector benefits from these 
outcomes because of generally lower feed costs. Economic Research Service/USDA Analysis of the U.S. Commodity Loan Program / AER-801 ✺ 1
Introduction
Commodity loan programs in the United States are
one of the major domestic support programs and have
been in existence in various forms since the 1930’s,
primarily covering major field crops. Different ver-
sions of these programs over time have been designed
to provide different benefits to producers, including
price support, income support, price stability, and
short-term liquidity.
Over the past 15 years, commodity loan programs for
major field crops have added marketing loan provi-
sions to existing nonrecourse loan provisions. As a
result, loan programs have effectively moved from
providing price support to providing income support
without supporting market prices. While annual costs
of marketing loans through 1997 were generally
small, lower commodity prices in the last few years
have led to significant budgetary costs. Total market-
ing loan benefits rose from less than $200 million for
1997 crops to more than $3.8 billion for 1998 and
about $8 billion for 1999 crops. USDA’s February
2000 baseline projections indicate a continuation of
sizeable marketing loan costs for the next several
years, as crop prices are projected to be below to
slightly above corresponding commodity loan rates
(USDA, Office of the Chief Economist). 
This report investigates the nature of market effects 
in the U.S. agricultural sector resulting from the 
commodity loan program with marketing loans. The
analysis focuses on acreage, production, use, and 
price effects of the program among major field 
crops directly affected by marketing loans. 
Analysis of the U.S. Commodity 
Loan Program with Marketing 
Loan Provisions
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Commodity Loan Programs—
Price Supports and 
Marketing Loans
Commodity loan programs have operated in two major
ways: price support and income support. Commodity
loan programs supported market prices over most of
their history, starting in 1933. With the more recent
introduction of marketing loan provisions, starting in
the mid-1980’s with rice and upland cotton, commod-
ity loan programs now provide income support to pro-
ducers but do not support market prices.
Loan Program Operation
Commodity loan programs allow producers of desig-
nated crops to receive loans from the government at a
crop-specific loan rate per unit of production by pledg-
ing production as loan collateral. A farmer may obtain a
loan for all or part of a crop at any time following har-
vest through the following March or the following May,
depending on the crop.1 Most loan placements occur
shortly after harvest, when prices tend to be seasonally
low, and provide short-term financing to farmers.
For production put under loan and pledged as loan 
collateral, the farmer receives a per-unit amount equal
to that year’s loan rate (in the farmer’s county) for the
crop. Under the loan program, the producer must keep
the crop designated as loan collateral in approved stor-
age to preserve the crop’s quality. The producer may
repay the loan (plus interest) at any time during the 
9- to 10-month loan period. 
Before marketing loans were introduced (discussed
next), the farmer could satisfy the loan by repaying the
loan principal plus accrued interest charges. Alterna-
tively, the farmer could choose to settle the loan at the
end of the loan period (loan maturity) by keeping the
loan proceeds and forfeiting ownership of the loan col-
lateral (the crop) to the government. If market prices
were below the loan rate, the farmer would benefit
from settling the loan this way, keeping the higher loan
rate. Additionally, if market prices were above the loan
rate but below the loan rate plus interest, keeping the
loan proceeds and forfeiting the crop to the govern-
ment would also make economic sense because the
cost of repaying the loan plus interest would be greater
than the market value of the crop. The loan program
provided price support to the sector by the govern-
ment’s acquiring crops through loan program forfei-
tures which, in combination with Commodity Credit
Corporation (CCC) sales price restrictions, essentially
removed crops from the marketplace as long as prices
remained low.2
Marketing loans were started for rice and upland cot-
ton in 1986 under provisions of the 1985 Farm Act.
Subsequent legislation mandated the availability of
marketing loans for soybeans and other oilseeds start-
ing in 1991. Marketing loans for wheat and feed grains
were implemented starting with 1993 crops, under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) trig-
ger provisions of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1990. The 1996 Farm Act continued marketing
loans for all of these crops. The addition of marketing
loan provisions significantly changed the operation of
the commodity loan program. 
Loan placements under the commodity loan program
with marketing loans may occur as described earlier
under nonrecourse loan provisions. Marketing loan
provisions, however, allow farmers to repay commod-
ity loans at less than the original loan rate (plus inter-
est) when market prices are lower. This feature
decreases the loan program’s potential effect on sup-
porting prices by reducing the government’s accumula-
tion of stocks through forfeitures. Instead, marketing
loans provide farmers economic incentives to retain
ownership of crops and sell them (hence the term
“marketing loan”) rather than forfeit ownership of
crops to the government to settle loans. 
Producers can receive marketing loan benefits through
two different channels: the loan program and loan defi-
ciency payments. Under the loan program, farmers
place their crop under the commodity loan program, as
described earlier, by pledging and storing all or part of
1 Generally, farm commodity program participation is a require-
ment for loan program eligibility. In the past, annual commodity
programs for feed grains, wheat, rice, and upland cotton included
supply management provisions (such as acreage reduction pro-
grams or set-aside programs), and required producers to comply
with such provisions to be eligible for program benefits, including
the loan program and target-price-based deficiency payments. The
1996 Farm Act eliminated supply management programs, but
required farmers of program crops to enroll at least one program
crop in the 7-year program to be eligible for program benefits,
including production flexibility contract payments and commodity
loans (Young and Westcott; Nelson and Schertz). There have been
no other program features for oilseeds beyond the loan program,
so no program enrollment has been required and all production of
oilseeds has been eligible for the loan program.
2 The 1996 Farm Act removed CCC sales price restrictions.Economic Research Service/USDA Analysis of the U.S. Commodity Loan Program / AER-801 ✺ 3
their production as collateral for the loan, receiving a
per-unit loan rate for the crop. But rather than repay
the full loan (plus interest), farmers may repay the
loan at a lower repayment rate at any time during the
loan period that market prices are below the loan rate.
Marketing loan repayment rates for wheat, feed grains,
and soybeans are based on local, posted county prices
(PCP), and repayment rates for rice and upland cotton
are based on the prevailing world market price.3 When
a farmer repays the loan at a lower posted county price
or prevailing world market price, the marketing loan
gain, or the difference between the loan rate and the
loan repayment rate, represents a program benefit to
producers. In addition, the program waives any
accrued interest on the loan when the loan repayment
rate is below the loan rate plus interest. 
Alternatively, farmers of crops covered by the loan
programs (except extra-long staple cotton) may choose
to receive marketing loan benefits through direct loan
deficiency payments (LDP). The LDP option allows
the producer to receive marketing loan benefits with-
out having to take out and subsequently repay a com-
modity loan. The LDP rate is the amount by which the
loan rate exceeds the posted county price or prevailing
world market price, and thus is equivalent to the mar-
keting loan gain that farmers could obtain for crops
under loan. If an LDP is paid on a portion of the crop,
that portion cannot subsequently go under loan. 
Loan Program History
Figures 1-5 show historical loan rates and annual
prices received by farmers for wheat, corn, soybeans,
rice, and upland cotton since 1950, as well as USDA’s
February 2000 baseline projections for these variables
(except cotton prices) through 2005. In some years,
annual crop prices were above the corresponding loan
rates, and farmers used the loan program mostly as a
source of short-term liquidity until they sold their
crops. In other years, crop prices were near loan rates,
and loan program activity supported market prices
through placements and forfeitures.
This price-supporting aspect of the loan program was
particularly evident before 1970, in the early- to mid-
1980’s for corn and wheat, in the early 1980’s for
upland cotton, and in the mid-1980’s for soybeans.
Loan placements during these periods were generally
high, representing a significant portion of production,
and farmers forfeited a large amount of those place-
ments to the government. For example, loan place-
ments of the 1985 soybean crop reached nearly 25 
percent of production, and farmers forfeited nearly 
60 percent of those placements (about 14 percent of
the crop) to the government (Schaub, McArthur,
Hacklander, Glauber, Leath, and Doty). Season aver-
age prices for soybeans for 1985 (when 1985 loan
placements occurred) and 1986 (when most 1985-crop
3 PCPs are calculated daily except weekends and holidays. Prevailing
world market prices for rice and upland cotton are calculated weekly.
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X = Higher FOR loan rate, 1980-82.
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Corn prices and loan rates, 1950-2005
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X = Higher FOR loan rate, 1980-82.















Soybean prices and loan rates, 1950-2005
$/bushel
Note: There was no commodity loan program for the 1975 soybean crop.
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Upland cotton prices and loan rates, 1950-2005
Note: USDA is prohibited from publishing cotton price projections. The 1999 price shown is the average of 
the first 2 months of the crop year, reflecting data available when the baseline analysis was conducted.
Source: 1999-2005, February 2000 USDA baseline projections for loan rates.
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loan program forfeitures occurred) were within a few
cents of the loan rates. 
Support to corn and wheat prices in the early- to mid-
1980’s reflected the loan program augmented by the
farmer-owned reserve (FOR). In 1982, for example,
loan program forfeitures pushed government-owned
stocks of corn to more than 1.1 billion bushels, or 16
percent of annual use, while government-owned stocks
of wheat rose to almost 200 million bushels, represent-
ing 8 percent of annual use. Incentives provided for
crops entered into the multiyear FOR (storage subsi-
dies and, in some years, a higher loan rate) further
encouraged loan placement activity for corn and
wheat. By 1982, corn held in the FOR rose to almost
1.9 billion bushels, about 26 percent of annual use,
and the wheat FOR exceeded 1 billion bushels, repre-
senting 44 percent of annual use. The long duration of
grain storage under the FOR program, along with high
release prices needed for grain to exit the reserve,
effectively isolated a large amount of grain from the
marketplace and combined with the high level of 
government-owned stocks to significantly affect corn
and wheat prices (Westcott and Hoffman).
In recent years, strong U.S. and global production 
combined with some weakening of world demand due
to the global financial crisis led to a decline in crop
prices from the relatively high levels of the mid-1990’s.
Projected prices in USDA’s 2000 baseline remain near
or below loan rates for the next several years (USDA,
OCE). The introduction of marketing loan provisions to
the commodity loan programs, however, has changed
the nature of this domestic support program from the
price-supporting role of earlier loan programs. While
marketing loans still provide an economic incentive to
producers, the program benefit is now provided through
income transfer rather than price support achieved by
government acquisition of the crop through loan pro-
gram forfeitures. Under marketing loan provisions,
producers generally retain ownership of the crop and
sell it in the marketplace at market prices, without
prices being supported by government purchases.
Nonetheless, marketing loan benefits to producers mean
that the economic incentive for production decisions is
related to the loan rate rather than to the market price,
thus introducing potential production-influencing effects
into the marketplace.
The 1996 Farm Act limited marketing loan benefits
(through marketing loan gains or loan deficiency pay-
ments) to $75,000 per person per year. For payment
limitation purposes, a three-entity rule allows farmers
to have a full share in one farm entity and as much as
a 50-percent share in two additional farm entities,
thereby doubling the effective payment limitation for
an individual producer. The payment limitation for
marketing loan benefits was subsequently raised to
$150,000 for 1999 crops. Further, in early 2000, the
availability of commodity certificates resumed. Pro-
ducers with outstanding nonrecourse loans can pur-
chase commodity certificates and then exchange them
for the commodities under loan. Certificates are
designed to limit loan program forfeitures of crops to
the government. They also enable producers to
receive marketing loan benefits unconstrained by
payment limitations.Economic Research Service/USDA Analysis of the U.S. Commodity Loan Program / AER-801 ✺ 7
Marketing Loans and Realized
Per-Unit Revenues
The availability of marketing loans introduces a number
of new influences into the production and marketing
decisions of farmers and the resulting level of revenues. 
Basic Marketing Loan Operation
In the simplest approach to using marketing loans, a
producer can effectively receive a per-unit revenue
equal to the loan rate by taking the marketing loan
benefit and immediately selling the crop, assuming the
sales price equals the posted county price. The market-
ing loan benefit augments the market price so the total
per-unit revenue comes partly from the marketplace
and partly from the government. In this situation,
marketing loans provide an effective per-unit revenue
floor at the loan rate for eligible crops, with a counter-
cyclical effect occurring through marketing loan bene-
fits when the price is below the loan rate. 
Marketing loans, however, do not establish a floor for
market prices since commodities typically remain
available to the marketplace rather than being acquired
by the government through loan program forfeitures.
For the basic marketing loan case, when the expected
market price for a given crop is below its loan rate, the
loan rate provides the economic incentive to plant that
crop because marketing loan benefits augment market
receipts. As a result, producers plant more acreage to
supported crops than they otherwise would. Further, if
loan rates do not reflect relative market prices, the mix
of crops planted also may be affected. 
Realized Per-Unit Revenues
In practice, however, marketing loans have introduced
a two-step crop marketing decision process that has
resulted in national average per-unit revenues received
by farmers that exceed commodity loan rates. In the
first step, the farmer decides when to take the market-
ing loan benefit (LDP or marketing loan gain, if the
crop is placed under loan). In the second step, the
farmer decides when to sell the crop. 
The program has only a few restrictions on these deci-
sions. First, LDPs can be paid on a crop only when
the crop is eligible to be placed under the loan pro-
gram. Loans may be taken out at any time following
harvest through the following March or the following
May, depending on the crop. Second, for a crop
placed under loan, potential marketing loan gains
have to be taken by repaying the loan prior to its 
expiration (and forfeiture of the loan collateral to the
government). Finally, a farmer must still own a crop
(beneficial interest) when the marketing loan benefit
is taken. That is, the farmer may not take the benefit
after the crop is sold. Thus, the first marketing deci-
sion of when to take the marketing loan benefit must
precede the second marketing decision of when to sell
the crop.
In the basic marketing loan operation described earlier,
taking the marketing loan benefit and selling the crop
occur simultaneously, and the farmer assures a per-unit
revenue equal to the loan rate. In practice, however,
farmers tend to take the marketing loan benefit when
prices are seasonally low and sell the crop at a later
date when market prices have risen. Thus, the first
marketing decision is to take the marketing loan 
benefit when that benefit is relatively large, followed
by the second marketing decision to sell the crop 
later when prices have risen. Ironically, the best time
to make the first marketing decision and take the 
marketing loan benefit is when prices are lowest, an
atypical situation for sellers to seek. 
Because of the seasonality of prices for an annually
produced commodity such as field crops, this two-step
marketing procedure results in marketing loans facili-
tating farmers receiving an effective per-unit revenue
that on average exceeds the loan rates for eligible
crops (see Marketing Loan Benefits box, page 8). 
As with any annual average price or per-unit revenue
concept, some producers receive more than the aver-
age and some less. For example, a risk-averse producer
may simply take the marketing loan benefit and imme-
diately sell the crop, thereby receiving the loan rate
level of per-unit revenue provided directly by the 
program. However, other producers will successfully
use the two-step marketing procedure and benefit from
the direct program effects and the seasonality of prices
to attain a greater per-unit revenue. 
Raising the realized per-unit revenue above the loan
rate also increases the economic incentive to plant
crops. This further encourages producers to plant more
land to supported crops than they otherwise would
and, as discussed earlier, may also influence the mix
of crops planted. 8 ✺ Analysis of the U.S. Commodity Loan Program / AER-801 Economic Research Service/USDA
Marketing Loan Benefits Push Per-Unit Revenues Above Loan Rates
Marketing loan benefits for 1999 crops illustrate how
farmers’average realized per-unit revenues are raised
above the loan rate. Through mid-August 2000, 95
percent of the 1999 soybean crop had received a 
marketing loan benefit. About 88 percent had received
an LDP, with an average payment rate of $0.91 per
bushel; and about 7 percent had received a marketing
loan gain averaging $0.76 per bushel. The rest of the
1999 soybean crop did not receive a marketing loan
benefit, although some 1999 soybean commodity
loans were still outstanding.
Accounting for LDPs, marketing loan gains, and the
portion of the crop with no marketing loan benefit,
the weighted-average marketing loan benefit for the
1999 soybean crop was about $0.85 per bushel. This
benefit augmented the season-average price of $4.65
per bushel, raising the average per-unit revenue for
soybeans to $5.50 per bushel, $0.24 above the 1999
national soybean loan rate of $5.26 per bushel. 
Similar benefits went to other field crops with 
marketing loan provisions in 1999: wheat, corn, grain
sorghum, barley, oats, rice, and upland cotton (table),
as well as several minor oilseeds. For all of these
crops, marketing loan benefits supplemented market
receipts, resulting in average per-unit total revenues
exceeding the national loan rates. As with soybeans,
marketing loan benefits for wheat, corn, grain
sorghum, oats, upland cotton, and rice raised the 
average per-unit revenue above the loan rate from a 
season-average price that was below the loan rate.
Realized average per-unit revenues increased by marketing loan benefits, 1999
Season Marketing Average 1999 Realized average
average loan per-unit commodity revenue
Crop price benefit revenue loan rate above loan rate
Dollars/bushel
Corn 1.80 0.23 2.03 1.89 0.14
Sorghum 1.55 0.25 1.80 1.74 0.06
Barley 2.15 0.14 2.29 1.59 0.70
Oats 1.10 0.19 1.29 1.13 0.16
Wheat 2.50 0.40 2.90 2.58 0.32
Soybeans 4.65 0.85 5.50 5.26 0.24
Dollars/hundredweight
Rice 6.10 1.80 7.90 6.50 1.40
Dollars/pound
Upland cotton 0.449 0.198 0.647 0.5192 0.127
August 2000 WASDE report (USDA, WAOB) and August 16, 2000 marketing loan data (based on cumulative LDP and loan activity data
from Farm Service Agency’s PSL-82R report). Upland cotton price is the average of August 1999 through June 2000.Economic Research Service/USDA Analysis of the U.S. Commodity Loan Program / AER-801 ✺ 9
Analytical Framework
Figures 6 through 8 illustrate the effects of marketing
loans on commodity markets. Figure 6 starts with 
a simple no-program situation without market distor-
tions. Market equilibrium is at the intersection of sup-
ply and demand at point e with a price of pe and an
equilibrium quantity of qe. This no-program equilib-
rium provides a reference point for assessing impacts
of the alternative policy situation of a commodity loan
program with marketing loan provisions. 
Figure 7 illustrates a commodity loan program with
marketing loans, with a loan rate that exceeds the no-
program price equilibrium. The basic effect of a com-
modity loan program with marketing loans is that the
supply curve is kinked and becomes perfectly inelastic
at the loan rate. For any price movement below the
loan rate, the producer can capture a marketing loan
benefit, through either a marketing loan gain or a loan
deficiency payment. Assuming that the sales price for
the crop is equal to the posted county price, the mar-
keting loan benefit ensures a per-unit revenue for the
crop equal to the loan rate. In this basic marketing
loan case, the loan rate becomes the producer incentive
price that applies for the supply curve at all prices
below the loan rate. The demand function for the 
commodity is not affected by marketing loans, so it
remains the same as in figure 6. A new equilibrium
results at point e' at a price of p' and a quantity of q'. 
As discussed earlier, the realized level of per-unit 
revenue facilitated by marketing loans is higher than
the loan rate. Figure 8 depicts this situation. As in 
figure 7, the supply curve is again kinked and becomes
perfectly inelastic, here at a level that exceeds the loan
rate by an additional amount of realized per-unit 
revenue (denoted by “s”). Compared with figure 7, the
new equilibrium in figure 8 (at point e") has a lower
price (p") and a higher quantity (q"). The higher 
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Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.
MLG = Marketing loan gain.
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Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.
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augmenting the market price by the marketing loan
benefit.4 This total per-unit revenue becomes the pro-
ducer incentive price, providing the economic incen-
tive for q" to be produced for all prices below the loan
rate plus s (or equivalently, all prices below the market
price plus the marketing loan benefit).5
Comparisons with the no-program equilibrium at point
e provide an indication of the effects introduced by
marketing loans. With marketing loans, the producer
incentive price rises from the no-program price equi-
librium level of pe to a level equal to the loan rate plus
the realized additional revenue (s), which also equals
p" plus the marketing loan benefit. That is, in figure 8,
LR + s =  p" + MLB
with LR representing the loan rate; MLB, the marketing
loan benefit; and s and p" defined earlier.6 In response to
this higher producer incentive price, farmers expand pro-
duction (by q" - qe in figure 8). Because marketing loans
do not affect the demand function, the increase in pro-
duction moves the equilibrium down along the demand
function. At the new equilibrium, the quantity demanded
is augmented by the same amount as the production
increase (q" - qe), with increases in both domestic use
and exports. The increase in production reduces the 
market price (by pe - p" in figure 8). While marketing
loans raise the producer incentive price to LR + s, the
market price is lower at the new equilibrium.
Marketing loan benefits for one crop affect other crops
as well. The higher producer incentive price for market-
ing loan crops shifts the supply curve to the left for
other crops that compete with marketing loan crops for
planted acreage. The reduction in market prices for mar-
keting loan crops moves the demand curve to the left for
crops that compete with (are substitutes for) the market-
ing loan crops in uses, while moving the demand curve
to the right for crops that are demand complements with
the marketing loan crops. Empirically, supply adjust-
ments dominate in these cross-commodity effects.
6 Although the market price and the marketing loan benefit are
observable, they each change and vary inversely with each other.
Thus, for analytical purposes the equivalent per-unit revenue to
their sum of the loan rate plus s is useful because the loan rate is
pre-determined for any given year and a plantings-time expectation
for s can be assumed to be relatively constant across years.
4 The amount s is not directly observable. However, the market
price, the marketing loan benefit, and the loan rate are observable,
so s can be derived.
5 This analytical framework does not include effects of commodity
loan programs and marketing loans in reducing downside revenue
risk when market prices are near or below loan rates. This effect
could shift the vertical portion of the supply curve further to the right
in figure 8 and could make some portion of the supply curve more
inelastic for prices above the loan rate plus s. As such, some of the
impacts discussed in the following sections could be somewhat
understated and some could extend for additional time periods.Economic Research Service/USDA Analysis of the U.S. Commodity Loan Program / AER-801 ✺ 11
Modeling Framework 
and Implementation
An analysis of the period 1998 to 2005 illustrates the
effects of commodity loan programs with marketing
loans. The analysis uses USDA’s February 2000 base-
line and simulations of a U.S. agricultural sector
model, FAPSIM (see box, page 13). 
The USDA 2000 baseline projects market prices that
are lower than the corresponding loan rates (plus s) for
the next several years, resulting in a continuation of
marketing loan benefits for producers. FAPSIM was
initially simulated to depict the 2000 USDA baseline
scenario that incorporates the effects of marketing
loans, including the higher level of per-unit revenues
facilitated by marketing loans. These higher per-unit
revenues were incorporated into the model’s acreage
response equations by augmenting the loan rate terms
in net returns calculations by expected values for the
additional per-unit revenues (s). The baseline scenario’s
assumed values for the expected additional per-unit
revenues (table 1) were based on 1998 results 
(Westcott) and initial 1999 data. These values compare
favorably for each crop with the realized additional 
revenues for 1999 shown in the table in the Marketing
Loan Benefits box on page 8, with only the realized
additional 1999 revenue for rice being much different
from that assumed here for the baseline.7 Figures 9-13
show the resulting average, effective, per-unit revenue
floors for wheat, corn, soybeans, rice, and upland cot-
ton along with the baseline loan rates. In each chart, the
difference between the two lines represents the addi-
tional per-unit revenues facilitated by marketing loans.
Acreage decisions are based on expected net returns,
which include as their expected price term the higher
of the lagged market price or the current loan rate 
augmented by the additional marketing-loan-facilitated
revenue. That is, expected net returns are defined 
as follows:
NRi
T =  max (pi
T-1,L R i
T + s) * expected yieldi
T
- variable production costsi
T
where NR represents expected net returns, p is price,
LR is the loan rate, s is the additional, above-loan-rate
per-unit revenue facilitated by marketing loans,
subscript i denotes the commodity, and superscripts T
and T-1 represent annual time periods. The acreage
response functions used were of the form:
Ai
T = f [NRi
T,N R j
T, other terms]
= f [max (pi
T-1,L R i





where A represents acreage planted to a crop, subscript
j denotes an alternative crop, and other variables are as
defined above.8
We then ran a second model simulation with FAPSIM,
one with no commodity loan program. In this simula-
tion, the terms LRi
T + s are removed from net returns,
so that lagged market prices represent expected per-
unit revenues used in the acreage decisions. This simu-
lation provides a reference scenario from which to
measure effects of commodity loan programs with
marketing loans. 
7 Rice marketing loan benefits for the 1998 crop were negligible
since rice prices were higher in that crop year. Rice marketing loan
benefits were assumed at 75 cents per hundredweight above the
loan rate for rice, based on benefits for the 1999 crop known at the
time the baseline projections were made. Although realized bene-
fits were subsequently higher, the assumption of 75 cents above
the rice loan rate used in the baseline scenario corresponds more
closely with producers’ expectations at the time of planting.
8 Effects of payment limitations are not explicitly included in the
model. Any such effects are likely to be small, particularly with
the availability of commodity certificates starting in early 2000.
Table 1—FAPSIM simulation assumptions for
expected additional per-unit revenues (s) 
facilitated by marketing loans
Assumed expected average revenue
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Figure 9
Wheat loan rates and effective per-unit
revenue floor
$/bushel
Sources: February 2000 USDA baseline projections and 
Economic Research Service, USDA.
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Rice loan rates and effective per-unit
revenue floor
$/cwt
Sources: February 2000 USDA baseline projections and 
Economic Research Service, USDA.
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Soybean loan rates and effective per-unit
revenue floor
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Sources: February 2000 USDA baseline projections and 
Economic Research Service, USDA.
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Corn loan rates and effective per-unit
revenue floor
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Sources: February 2000 USDA baseline projections and 
Economic Research Service, USDA.
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Upland cotton loan rates and effective per-unit
revenue floor
Sources: February 2000 USDA baseline projections and 
Economic Research Service, USDA.
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The Model Simulation System—FAPSIM
The Food and Agricultural Policy Simulator 
(FAPSIM) is an annual econometric model of the 
U.S. agricultural sector. The U.S. Department of 
Agriculture originally developed the model during 
the early 1980’s (Salathe, Price, and Gadson; Gadson,
Price, and Salathe). Since that time, FAPSIM has
been continually re-estimated and re-specified to
reflect changes in the structure of the U.S. food and
agricultural sector. The model incorporates over 
700 equations. Here, we give only a brief discussion
of its general structure and content.
FAPSIM contains three broad types of relationships:
definitional, institutional, and behavioral. Definitional
equations include identities that reflect mathematical
relationships that must hold among the data in the
model. For example, total demand must equal total
supply for a commodity at any point in time. The
model constrains solutions to satisfy all identities of
this type.
Institutional equations involve relationships between
variables that reflect certain institutional arrange-
ments in the sector. This would include commodity
loan rates, for example, that are announced annually
for major crops, using fixed formulas established by
U.S. farm programs. 
Definitional and institutional equations reflect known
relationships that necessarily hold among the vari-
ables in the model. Behavioral equations differ
because the exact relationship among variables is 
not known and must be estimated. Economic theory
determines the types of variables to include in 
behavioral equations, but theory does not indicate the
precise relationship between the variables. Examples
of behavior relationships in FAPSIM are the acreage
equations for different field crops. Economic theory
indicates that production should be positively related
to the price received for the commodity and nega-
tively related to prices of inputs required in the pro-
duction process. Producer net returns are used in the
FAPSIM acreage equations to capture these economic
effects. The net returns measures also include policy
features, such as marketing loan benefits, that can
influence planting choices. Additionally, the acreage
equations include net returns for other crops that 
compete with each other for land use.
For the most part, FAPSIM uses a linear relationship
to approximate the general functional form for each
behavioral relationship. All parameters in the linear
behavioral relationships were estimated by single-
equation regression methods. The large size of the
model precludes the use of econometric methods
designed for systems of equations. Ordinary least
squares was used to estimate most of the equations.
If statistical tests indicated the presence of either
autocorrelation or heteroscedasticity in the error
structure of an equation, maximum likelihood 
methods or weighted least squares were used.
Commodities included in FAPSIM are corn,
sorghum, barley, oats, wheat, rice, upland cotton,
soybeans, cattle, hogs, broilers, turkeys, eggs,
and dairy. Each commodity submodel contains 
equations to estimate production, prices, and the
different demand components. The submodels are
then linked together through common variables that
are important to the different commodities. The
model solution computes the market prices that
equilibrate supply and demand in all commodity
markets simultaneously.
The ability of the FAPSIM model to simulate 
different policies lends itself to analysis of the com-
modity loan program with marketing loans. Further,
the variables in the model reflect USDA’s baseline
projections, which are a Departmental consensus on
a longrun scenario for the U.S. agricultural sector.
The baseline projections are based on specific
assumptions regarding the macroeconomy, inter-
national developments, weather, and agricultural 
policies. Thus, the baseline provides a well-defined
scenario from which alternative scenarios can be
compared. The analysis in this report is based on
long-term projections from USDA’s February 2000
baseline (USDA, OCE). 14 ✺ Analysis of the U.S. Commodity Loan Program / AER-801 Economic Research Service/USDA
Simulation Results
Model simulation results illustrate the effects of com-
modity loan programs with marketing loan provisions.
Results, however, are dependent on features of the
USDA 2000 baseline used in the analysis. In particu-
lar, impacts depend on the magnitude of marketing
loan benefits in the baseline and thus depend on both
price projections and loan rate assumptions. For exam-
ple, larger impacts than discussed here would result for
scenarios with lower prices and larger marketing loan
benefits. Conversely, smaller impacts would result
with higher prices and smaller marketing loan benefits. 
Additionally, a key feature of the USDA 2000 baseline
is an assumption that loan rates for corn, wheat, and
soybeans would be set following formulas set forth in
the 1996 Farm Act, starting for the 2001 crops. Alter-
natively, if the baseline had assumed that the Secretary
of Agriculture would use discretionary authority to
leave loan rates at their legislative maximums, as was
done for 2000 crops of upland cotton and soybeans,
then marketing loan benefits would have been higher
in the baseline and simulated impacts of those loan
program benefits would be larger than presented here.9
Loan Program Benefits
The commodity loan program scenario with marketing
loans introduces expectations of program benefits to
the sector in 1998 through 2005 because loan rates
plus s (additional revenues) exceed expected (lagged)
market prices from the “no loan program” scenario for
at least one of the marketing loan crops in each of
those years—that is, marketing loan benefits would be
expected through loan deficiency payments and/or
marketing loan gains. As shown in figures 14-18,
prices in the “no loan program” scenario from the pre-
vious year are below loan rates plus s in the current
year for wheat and corn from 1999 through 2001,
soybeans from 1999 through 2004, rice from 1999
through 2005, and upland cotton in 1999 and 2000.
Thus, the introduction of commodity loans with mar-
keting loan provisions would result in marketing loan
benefits expected to occur in those periods. Additional
marketing loan benefits would be expected for upland
cotton but are not illustrated here because USDA is
prohibited from publishing cotton price forecasts. 
9 Analysis of alternative loan rates in a commodity loan program
with marketing loans is beyond the scope of this report. Higher loan
rates, however, such as those set at their legislative maximums in
years when formula loan rates would be lower, result in higher
budgetary costs. Budgetary costs of marketing loan benefits reflect
three factors: (1) the quantity of a crop eligible for commodity loans
(currently, nearly all production of loan program crops is eligible for
loans), (2) the loan rate, and (3) the market price. With a higher loan
rate, each of these three factors moves in a direction that increases
budgetary costs. First, the loan rate is higher, increasing the per-unit
marketing loan benefit (loan deficiency payment or marketing loan
gain). Second, the higher loan rate (and marketing loan benefit) 
provides an economic incentive for increased production, raising the
loan-eligible quantity. Third, the increase in production lowers the
market price, further raising the difference to the loan rate and, thus,
the per-unit marketing loan benefit.











Wheat prices, loan rates, and effective per-unit
revenue floor
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Sources: February 2000 USDA baseline projections and 
Economic Research Service, USDA.
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Aggregate Acreage Impacts
Total plantings of crops are higher in the marketing
loan scenario, reflecting the addition of program bene-
fits to the sector from the commodity loan program
with marketing loans. Increases in the aggregate level
of acreage planted to crops are highest when total mar-
keting loan benefits are largest and when benefits
accrue to more of the crops. As shown in figure 19,
acreage gains are largest for crop years 1999 through
2001, with aggregate increases for eight major field
crops of 2 to 4 million acres compared with the no
loan program scenario. In those years, most of the
crops receive marketing loan benefits and those mar-
keting loan benefits for each crop are highest because
market prices are at their lowest levels.
For 2002 and beyond, total acreage impacts are
smaller, falling to under 1 million acres in 2002 and to
only 100,000 in 2005, as fewer crops receive benefits
and the remaining benefits are smaller. This result
reflects a general recovery in crop prices in the USDA
baseline projections scenario as well as an assumption
in the baseline that loan rates for wheat, corn, and soy-
beans are lower than their legislated maximums in
2001 through 2005, thereby lowering marketing loan
benefits from the 1999 and 2000 highs. 
Importantly, aggregate acreage effects beyond 2005
are small. Thus, impacts on plantings are largely con-
fined to years when marketing loan benefits augment
expected market returns. Only small dynamic, carry-
over effects on plantings occur in subsequent years
beyond 2005 when prices rise sufficiently above loan
rates to eliminate marketing loan benefits.10
Crop-Specific Acreage Impacts
Within the aggregate increases in plantings because of
marketing loans, acreage impacts for individual crops
reflect the initial relationship between expected crop
prices and their respective loan rates plus s, the effects
of corresponding marketing loan benefits on absolute
and relative net returns among cropping alternatives,
and the acreage response elasticities. 
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Upland cotton prices, loan rates, and effective 
per-unit revenue floor
Note: USDA is prohibited from publishing cotton price projections. The 
1999 "no loan program" price shown reflects a simulated price change 
from the average cotton price for the first 2 months of the year.
Price, no loan program scenario
¢/pound
Sources: February 2000 USDA baseline projections and 
Economic Research Service, USDA.
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loan rate + s
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loan rate
10 This result differs from the effects of price-supporting loan pro-
grams as existed prior to the introduction of marketing loans. For
such programs, stock accumulation by the government through
loan forfeitures in lower priced years led to release of government
stocks at a later time, thus extending market impacts over a longer
time period. However, multiyear, cumulative impacts under a
price-supporting loan program are largely offsetting.16 ✺ Analysis of the U.S. Commodity Loan Program / AER-801 Economic Research Service/USDA
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Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.







Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.



















Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.

























Upland cotton planted acreage
Mil. acres
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.
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Wheat and corn plantings are initially higher with mar-
keting loans as the effects of their program benefits are
larger than cross-commodity effects from marketing
loan benefits of other crops (figs. 20-21). From 2001
to 2004, however, corn plantings are lower, largely
because marketing loan benefits for soybeans draw
land away from corn. Similarly, wheat plantings are
lower in 2002 because marketing loan benefits for
competing crops switch land away from wheat.
Soybean plantings are higher with marketing loans
through 2004 except in 2000 (fig. 22). Marketing loan
benefits increase soybean net returns relative to returns
for other crops in most years of the simulations, pro-
viding an economic incentive to plant more soybeans.
In 2000, however, relatively large marketing loan ben-
efits for corn pull land away from soybeans. 
Rice and cotton plantings are also larger (figs. 23-24)
as effects of their own marketing loan benefits on net
returns and plantings exceed cross-commodity effects
from other crops.
Export Impacts
Effects on U.S. exports of commodity loan programs
with marketing loan provisions reflect the effects on
planted acreage. In figure 8, to the extent that exports
are a portion of the new equilibrium quantity
demanded, some part of q'' - qe represents a program
effect on exports. These export impacts and related
effects on global trade have important implications for
treatment of U.S. programs under the World Trade
Organization (see WTO box, page 19).
In years and for commodities with increased acreage
and production, agricultural markets clear at lower
prices with a higher equilibrium quantity demanded,
including exports. Conversely, in years and for crops
with lower acreage and production (due to relatively
stronger cross-commodity effects of marketing loan
benefits for competing crops), U.S. exports may be
lower. Thus, the export effects shown for wheat, corn,
soybeans and products, rice, and cotton in figures 
25-31 reflect the impacts on acreage discussed earlier. 
Under the marketing loan scenario, wheat exports are
higher through 2001, reflecting increased wheat plant-
ings, higher production, and lower prices in those
years. U.S. exports of corn are higher in the marketing
loan simulations in 1999 and 2000 as corn plantings
are increased, but then corn exports fall slightly for
2001 through 2003, reflecting the reduction in corn
plantings due to relatively strong effects of marketing
loan benefits for soybeans. Exports of soybeans are
increased through 2004 except in 2000 when corn pro-
gram benefits lead to lower soybean plantings. Exports
of soybean meal and soybean oil rise as well when
soybean acreage increases as higher domestic crush of
soybeans leads to higher production and lower prices
in soybean product markets. Rice and cotton exports
also increase due to higher production and lower
prices for those crops.
As for the acreage effects, U.S. export impacts occur
primarily in the years when marketing loan benefits
exist, with limited effects in subsequent years.
Domestic Use Impacts
With generally higher plantings in the marketing loan
scenario, lower prices tend to raise domestic use as well.
However, for some crops in some years, acreage reduc-
tions resulting from relatively higher marketing loan
benefits of competing crops lead to higher prices and
somewhat reduced domestic use. In the model simula-
tions, this result is most evident for corn from 2001 to
2003 as soybean program benefits draw land from corn,
leading to somewhat lower domestic use of corn. 
Higher soybean production, however, leads to lower soy-
bean prices and increased crush, resulting in lower soy-
bean meal prices and higher domestic use of soybean
meal by the livestock sector. Overall, even with higher
corn prices in some years, the reduction in soybean 
meal prices results in lower overall livestock feeding
costs, particularly for the poultry sector, which tends to
use feed rations with higher protein content. Thus, in
general, the livestock sector benefits from lower overall
feed prices. Meat production expands somewhat,
although output changes are less than 0.5 percent.
Price Impacts
As shown in figures 32-36 for wheat, corn, soybeans,
rice, and upland cotton, in years with gains in acreage,
higher production of these crops lowers their prices. In
the early years of the simulations, this reduction in
prices pushes them further below the corresponding
loan rates. Reflecting these price declines, marketing
loan benefits correspondingly rise from their initial
levels. And overall, the combination of price reduc-
tions with production increases adds to total budget
costs of marketing loans through both the rise in the
per-unit marketing loan benefit and the increase in the
quantity eligible for benefits.18 ✺ Analysis of the U.S. Commodity Loan Program / AER-801 Economic Research Service/USDA
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Figure 29
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In 1999 through 2001, wheat prices are lowered 4 to 7
cents per bushel in the marketing loan simulation,
while corn prices are reduced 3 to 9 cents per bushel
in 1999 and 2000. Later, when marketing loan bene-
fits shift land into soybeans (2001 through 2004),
prices for soybeans are reduced, with the largest
impact of 49 cents occurring in 2001 when acreage
gains for the crop are highest. Rice prices are reduced
throughout the simulation period, with declines of 
10 to 20 cents per hundredweight in 2000 through
2005. Simulated price reductions for upland cotton
range from 1 to 5 cents per pound through 2002, the
years of the largest cotton acreage increases due to
marketing loan benefits.
In other years, lower production for some crops that
lose acreage to competing crops pushes their prices up.
In particular, corn prices increase by 3 to 4 cents per
bushel in 2001 through 2003, as acreage shifts from
corn to soybeans. 
As with other marketing loan effects, crop price
impacts occur mostly in years when there are 
marketing loan benefits in the model simulations,
with little carryover effect to subsequent years after
marketing loan benefits are no longer present.















U.S. Export Impacts and the World Trade Organization
As a domestic support program, the effects of market-
ing loans on U.S. exports are important in the context
of U.S. commitments to the World Trade Organization
(WTO). For U.S. commitments to the WTO under the
1994 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
(URAA), marketing loan benefits are considered to be
“amber box” because of their potential to significantly
affect production and trade. 
WTO Treatment of Domestic 
Support Programs
The 1994 URAA categorized domestic support pro-
grams as amber box, green box, or blue box policies
based on whether the support provided was coupled
to production and the degree of the program’s poten-
tial effect on production and trade (Nelson,Young,
Liapis, and Schnepf; Young, Nelson, and Schnepf).
Amber box policies cover programs that have the
most potential to distort production and trade. These
policies are subject to limitations under the WTO
with the level of allowable support gradually falling
over time. U.S. amber box limitation commitments
under the agreement declined 20 percent over the 
6-year implementation phase-in period for developed
countries (1995-2000), from a base level of $23.879
billion to $19.103 billion for 2000.
Green box policies are those that have the smallest
effect on production and trade and are therefore per-
mitted without limitation under the WTO. Blue box
policies include payments made as part of programs
that also have production-limiting features.
Marketing loans are considered to be an amber box,
domestic support program for WTO notifications. This
classification reflects the general availability of mar-
keting loan benefits to program participants for pro-
duction of eligible crops regardless of use, as well as
the potential of marketing loan benefits to influence
crop production decisions of farmers through 
economic incentives provided by those benefits. 20 ✺ Analysis of the U.S. Commodity Loan Program / AER-801 Economic Research Service/USDA
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.
Figure 32
Wheat prices: No loan program and marketing
loan scenarios
$/bushel
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Figure 35
Rice prices: No loan program and marketing 
loan scenarios
$/cwt
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Figure 34
Soybean prices: No loan program and 
marketing loan scenarios
$/bushel
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Figure 33
Corn prices: No loan program and marketing
loan scenarios
$/bushel













Cotton price changes between scenarios are shown because 
USDA is prohibited from publishing cotton price projections.
Figure 36
Model-simulated upland cotton price changes,
marketing loan effects
¢/pound
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.Economic Research Service/USDA Analysis of the U.S. Commodity Loan Program / AER-801 ✺ 21
Conclusions
The U.S. commodity loan program with marketing loan
provisions provides countercyclical program benefits to
farmers of major field crops through revenue-boosting
loan deficiency payments and marketing loan gains
when market prices are low. Marketing loans enable
producers to realize a level of per-unit revenues that,
on average, exceeds the commodity loan rate—many
farmers use a two-step marketing procedure in which
they receive program benefits when prices are season-
ally low (and program benefits high) and then sell their
crop later in the marketing year when prices have risen.
The historical above-loan-rate level of realized per-unit
revenues facilitated by marketing loans provides a floor
for farmers’expectations of per-unit revenues in subse-
quent years. 
Marketing loans influence planting decisions and
acreage allocation because program benefits are linked
to farmers’ current production, thereby affecting
expected net returns for crops. Most effects for a mar-
keting loan crop reflect an increase in its production
and the resulting market response to the larger supply.
That is, additional market impacts on domestic use,
U.S. exports, and crop prices primarily reflect market
adjustments to the increased production for the mar-
keting loan crop, leading to a new equilibrium at a
lower price and an increased quantity demanded.
Cross-commodity effects also are important, reflecting
acreage shifts among competing crops. Acreage changes
for individual crops reflect the effects of marketing loan
benefits on absolute and relative net returns among
cropping alternatives, as well as acreage response elas-
ticities. In some cases, cross-commodity effects reduce
acreage and production of crops receiving relatively low
or no marketing loan benefits, lowering domestic use
and exports of those crops while raising their prices. 
Most effects of marketing loans occur in the years
when prices are low enough that marketing loan bene-
fits exist. Only small dynamic, carryover effects occur
in later years after prices rise sufficiently to eliminate
marketing loan benefits. This result differs from that of
price-supporting loan programs that existed prior to
the introduction of marketing loans.
Simulations of an econometric model for the U.S. agri-
cultural sector (FAPSIM) were used with the February
2000 USDA baseline to compare a commodity loan
program scenario with marketing loans that represents
current policy and a scenario with no commodity loan
program. Overall, increased support to the sector
increases total plantings of crops. Within this aggre-
gate, results show that direct marketing loan benefits
dominate in most years for most crops, with higher
acreage, production, domestic use, and exports, and
lower prices. However, for some crops in some years,
cross-commodity effects dominate, causing declines in
acreage, production, domestic use, and exports and
increases in prices, as marketing loan benefits draw
land to competing crops. 
Magnitudes of the simulated impacts are dependent on
the size of the marketing loan benefits included in the
2000 USDA baseline. Larger impacts would result for
scenarios with lower prices and larger marketing loan
benefits. Conversely, smaller effects would result with
higher prices and smaller marketing loan benefits.
Additionally, larger impacts would result if loan rates
for corn, wheat, and soybeans in the USDA baseline
were assumed to remain at their legislated maximums
instead of being lowered from those levels to reflect
1996 Farm Act formulas for loan rate determination.
Nonetheless, results shown in this report illustrate
some of the key properties of how commodity loan
programs with marketing loan provisions affect agri-
cultural commodity markets. 22 ✺ Analysis of the U.S. Commodity Loan Program / AER-801 Economic Research Service/USDA
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